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GENOCIDAL DISCREPANCIES
A genocide is a poisonous bush, that grows not from 
two or three roots but from a tangle of roots that has 
mouldered underground where no one notices it.
Claudine Kayitesi1 
INTRODUCTION
Genocide may be the most recent crime to have been introduced into international 
criminal law, but its codification has been considered as the first human rights approach 
within the UN system2 and is often called ‘the crime of the crimes’ in the international 
order. The need to introduce international criminal responsibility for genocide appeared 
after the Second World War, when atrocities committed by the Nazi regime elicited 
a worldwide reaction. Unfortunately, Lemkin’s idea did not find its place among other 
international crimes in the Nuremberg trials, although it gave rise to the creation of 
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
The aim of this paper is to draw the reader’s attention to its shortcomings and to propose 
developments in the elements of the crime of genocide.
1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON GENOCIDE
The name for this crime was proposed in 1944 by a Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, in 
his book titled ‘The Axis Rule in Occupied Europe’3. Initially, the Holocaust committed 
on the Jewish nation before and during the Second World War was called by Lemkin as 
‘ethnocide’. However, the concept of ethnocide, as proposed by Lemkin, was raised too 
late to be placed in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg4; 
as a result, in the Nuremberg judgment it appeared as a crime against humanity5 
 1 J. Hatzfeld, Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak (translation: Linda Coverdale), New York 
2005, p. 90.
 2 A. Schabas, Genocide, “804 Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law” 2007, p. 2.
 3 R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for 
Redress, “The Lawbook Exchange” 2008. 
 4 Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS, Vol. 279.
 5 International Military Tribunal, Judgment of 1 October 1946, [in:] The Trial of German Major War 
Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 (22 
August, 1946 to 1 October, 1946), p. 501.
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and the prosecutor at the Nuremberg proceedings used the term ‘genocide’ in the 
pleadings6. 
The name ‘genocide’ was firstly officially used in the UN General Assembly Resolution 
96 (I) of 11 of December 1946. In this resolution, the General Assembly ascertained: 
“[G]enocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is 
the denial of the right to live of individual human beings”7. Genocide was understood as 
the partial or complete destruction of a group, committed on religious, racial, political 
or any other grounds. The resolution stipulated that the punishment of the crime of 
genocide was a matter of international concern, because each act of genocide formed 
a great loss to humanity, destroying the aggrieved group’s contribution to humankind. 
At the same time, the Resolution provided no instruments allowing the crime of genocide 
to be punished, only encouraging States to undertake the necessary legislation for the 
prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Nonetheless, it was a big first 
step in the battle to implementing Lemkin’s idea to both international and domestic 
legal systems. One year later, the General Assembly requested the Economic and 
Social Council to draft a convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime 
of genocide8. Resolution 180 (II) of 21 November 1947 ascertained that the crime of 
genocide entails an international responsibility of individuals, as well as States9, and 
recognised three categories of the crime: physical, biological and cultural10. Finally, on 
9 December 1948, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 260 A (III): Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter: the 1948 
Convention), which entered into force on 12 January 195111. 
This did not mean that work ceased on developing the concept of genocide, since it 
became a subject of interest of international human rights organisations12. After fifty-
seven years since the adoption of the 1948 Convention, the General Assembly, in its 
Resolution 60 (I): 2005 World Summit Outcome of 24 December 2005, reconsidered 
the issue of genocide, providing all States with the responsibility to protect the idea and 
imposing the obligation to protect all human beings from the crime of genocide13. 
The responsibility to protect doctrine, despite not being commonly accepted14, implies 
a primary responsibility of the State to protect its population from international crimes, 
and if a State is unable or unwilling to protect, then the international community has 
 6 Ibidem, p. 43; see also: J.Q. Barret, Raphael Lemkin and ‘Genocide’ at Nuremberg 1945–1946, [in:] 
C. Safferling and E. Conze, The Genocide Convention Sixty Years after its Adoption, the Hague 2010, 
pp. 44–46.
 7 UN General Assembly, Resolution 96 (I) of 11th of December 1946, UN Doc. A/RES/96(I).
 8 UN General Assembly, Resolution 180 (II): Draft Convention on Genocide of 21 November 1947, UN 
Doc. A/RES/180.
 9 Idem.
 10 UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 77 (V): Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, 6 August 1947, UN Doc. E/573, p. 18. 
 11 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, UNTS, Vol. 78, 
p. 277. 
 12 See: art. 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 1 July 2000, OAU Doc. CABL/LEG/23.15 
(2001).
 13 UN General Assembly, Resolution No. 60 (1): 2005 World Summit Outcome, 24 of October 2005, UN 
Doc. A/RES/60/1, pp. 138–140.
 14 E. McClean, The Responsibility to Protect: The Role of International Human Rights Law, „Journal of 
Conflicts & Security Law” 2008, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 123–152.
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a secondary responsibility to protect that population. Hence, the relationship between the 
obligation to prevent genocide and the responsibility to protect raises some difficulties. 
It is suggested that the preventive aspect of the responsibility to protect doctrine 
becomes crucial, because there would be no need for intervention if the prevention was 
successful. On the other hand, the obligation to prevent genocide is legally binding in 
nature, while the responsibility to protect deals with morality and political commitment 
rather than internationally legal obligations15, and therefore creates potentially weaker 
protection from genocide. However, the doctrine of responsibility to protect should be 
complementary to the obligation to prevent genocide arising from the 1948 Convention. 
Taking into account the nature of conflicts nowadays, however, as seen in Syria or Libya, 
the responsibility to protect seems rather a dead letter16, and the international community 
has failed to protect civilians from massive atrocities, possibly also from genocide17.
2. THE APPROACHES OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 
Article 1 of the 1948 Convention declares that genocide is an international crime, 
irrespective of whether it was committed in peacetime or at a time of war. The definition 
of genocide under the 1948 Convention is as follows: ‘[I]n the present Convention, 
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical or religious group, as such: killing members of the group (a); 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (b); deliberately inflicting 
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part (c); imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group (d); forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group (e).’ The statutes of ad hoc tribunals 
and the International Criminal Court have repeated the definition of genocide in the 
meaning of the 1948 Convention18. However, it is worth pointing out that cultural 
genocide has since been removed from the final text of the 1948 Convention.
Article 4 of the 1948 Convention sets out responsibility for: genocide, conspiracy, direct 
and public incitement, attempt and complicity in genocide. The Convention imposes 
an obligation on States to enact the necessary legislative procedure to implement these 
regulations, especially in the matter of punishing perpetrators of the crime of genocide. 
in addition, pursuant to Article 7, the Convention establishes a mechanism guaranteeing 
the prosecution of perpetrators, excluding political exceptions for extradition purposes. 
However, it does not provide any mechanisms for the prevention of genocide, creating 
 15 S. Pandiaraj, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Reflections on the Legal Status of the Doctrine of 
Responsibility to Protect, “Chinese Journal of International Law” 2016, Vol. 15, pp. 795–815. 
 16 Ibidem, pp. 811–813. 
 17 Al Jazeera, Burundi Risks Genocide Amid Forgotten Conflict, 15 November 2016, http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2016/11/burundi-risks-genocide-forgotten-conflict-161115142336120.html [22.06.2017]; see 
also: Human Rights Watch, Sudan. Events of 2016, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-
chapters/sudan [22.06.2017]. 
 18 See: Art. 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UNTS 90/37; see also: 
Art. 4 of the UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993): Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Art. 2 of UN Security Council Resolution 
955 (1994): Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 November 1994, UN Doc. S/RES/955 
(1994).
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instruments for the punishment of the crime only. The Convention introduces no 
enforcement procedures by which States would be obliged to adapt the 1948 Convention 
in their domestic legal systems. As a solution to the problem, the creation of a treaty 
body responsible for the control over the application of the 1948 Convention has 
been suggested19. Recalling the failure of preventive efforts that preceded tragedies 
in Rwanda and Srebrenica, in its Resolution 1366 of 30 August 2001, the Security 
Council underlined the importance and responsibility of States to prevent and end 
impunity for genocide20. Consequently, the Secretary-General appointed the first Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, who acts as an early warning mechanism by 
bringing to the attention of the Secretary-General and the Security Council potential 
situations that could result in genocide21. Nevertheless, as can be found on the website 
of the Special Adviser, this institution, alone cannot prevent genocide22. The Office of 
the Special Adviser, however, makers some crucial remarks on the preventive aspects of 
the 1948 Convention, stressing the importance of better understanding the roots that lead 
to international crimes. Genocide does not constitute a spontaneous act, being rather 
a process over time, and there are always some warnings preceding the crime. Hence, 
the Office on Genocide Prevention has provided a Framework Analysis that helps to 
identify common and specific risk factors for atrocities23. However, the Special Adviser 
addresses the primary responsibility of individual states to prevent its population from 
genocide, since it contributes to both national and international peace and security24. 
From the 1948 Convention’s entrance into force to the formation of the ad hoc 
Tribunals, only one case regarding individual criminal responsibility for genocide 
was upheld, although not explicitly in the context of genocide. It was the case of 
Adolf Eichmann, the main coordinator of the ‘final solution’ of the Jewish problem25. 
Eichmann was to be prosecuted in Nuremberg with other perpetrators of the Second 
World War, although he escaped to Argentina avoiding the Nuremberg proceedings. 
In 1960, Eichmann was finally captured and transported to Jerusalem, where the tribunal 
sentenced him to death, among other things for crimes against the Jewish nation. 
The jurisdiction of the Israeli tribunal was based on the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators 
Punishment Law No. 5710-1950 of 9 August 195026, which provided for the admissibility 
 19 A. Schabas, Genocide…, p. 18.
 20 UN Security Council, Resolution 1366 (2001) on the Role of the Security Council in the Prevention of 
Armed Conflicts, 30 August 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1366(2001).
 21 UN Secretary-General, Letter dated 12 July 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, 13 July 2004, S/2004/567. 
 22 See: Work of the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, http://www.un.org/en/
preventgenocide/adviser/engagement_partners.shtml [26.10.2016].
 23 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Framework of Analysis 
for Atrocity Crimes. A Tool for Prevention, New York 2014, http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/
documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.49_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes_EN.pdf 
[22.06.2017]. 
 24 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Resolution 2005/62: Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 20 April 2005, E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.17; see also: 
Human Rights Council, Resolution 7/25: Prevention of Genocide, 28 March 2008, A/HRC/RES/7/25 (2008). 
 25 District Court of Jerusalem, Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann, judgment of 12 December 1961, 
Case No. 40/61, 36 ILR 5.
 26 Israel, Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law No. 5710–1950, 9.08.1950, Sefer Ha Chukkim 
No. 57 of 5710, p. 281.
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of the prosecution of individuals suspected of crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
crimes against Jewish nation, committed under the Nazi regime. It should be noted that 
no legal system covered acts such as crimes against the Jewish nation. Such acts, under 
Article 1(b) of the Law, were as following: ‘killing Jews; placing Jews in living conditions 
calculated to bring about their physical destruction; imposing measures intended to prevent 
births among Jews; forcibly transferring Jewish children to another national or religious 
group; destroying or desecrating Jewish religious or cultural assets or values; inciting 
hatred of Jews’27. Comparing the abovementioned crimes with the acts listed in the 
1948 Convention, there is no doubt that they constituted nearly identical offences28. 
3. REPERCUSSIONS UPON 1948 CONVENTION 
The scope of the protection brought by Article 2 of the 1948 Convention covers 
national, ethnic, racial and religious groups. Unfortunately, this list eludes precise 
definition and leads to legal doubts29. In addition, it is commonly criticised as being too 
narrowly recognised30, excluding other groups such as political or social ones31. As was 
mentioned before, Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Article 2 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(hereinafter: ICTY) and Article 4 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (hereinafter: ICTR) cover the same list of protected groups. The problem, 
therefore, is not exclusively limited to the application of the 1948 Convention32, but 
extends to the work of other international criminal tribunals. The discrepancies 
regarding the definition of protected groups have been visible in Akayesu case pending 
before the ICTR33. In that case, the question of categorising the Tutsi tribe in any of 
the protected groups appeared. The definition of each group remains unclear, since 
the 1948 Convention does not include any explanation of national, ethnic, racial or 
religious groupings. In the doctrine, it is suggested that such a phenomenon is caused 
by three reasons. Firstly, for a long time the Contracting Parties to the 1948 Convention 
considered the 1948 Convention as a dead letter34. The very first process that involved 
explicit responsibility for the crime of genocide was held in 1998 before the ICTR35, 
so fifty years after the adoption of the 1948 Convention. Secondly, the meaning of the 
 27 Idem.
 28 M.J. Bazyler, J.Y. Scheppach, The Strange and Curious History of the Law Used to Prosecute Adolf 
Eichmann, “Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review” 2012, Vol. 34, No. 417, 
pp. 417–461, http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1685&context=ilr [19.10.2016].
 29 W.A. Schabas, Genocide…, p. 22.
 30 D.L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the International 
Criminal Tribunals, “Texas International Law Journal” 2002, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 232–276.
 31 F. Martin, The Notion of ‘Protected Group’ in the Genocide Convention and Its Application, [in:] 
P. Gaeta, The UN Genocide Convention – A Commentary, Oxford 2009, p. 112–127; see also: G. Werle, 
F. Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (third edition), Oxford 2014, p. 288.
 32 C. Lingaas, Defining the Protected Groups of the Genocide Through the Case Law of International 
Courts, “International Crimes Database Brief ” 2015, Vol. 18, p. 1, http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.
org/upload/documents/20151217T122733-Lingaas%20Final%20ICD%20Format.pdf [24.10.2016]. 
 33 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment of 2 September 1998, ICTR-96-4. 
 34 C. Lingaas, Defining the Protected Groups…, p. 4.
 35 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu…
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protected groups has been changing since the adoption of the Convention, in response 
to the technological and sociological developments. Finally, it has been suggested that 
the interpretation of the protected groups under Article 5 of the 1948 Convention was 
purposefully left to the national legislation of the State Parties36.
The ICTR in the Akayesu case based its judgment on travaux préparatoires of the 
1948 Convention and the definition of the group as such. The Tribunal considered 
genocide as: ‘targeting only “stable” groups, constituted in a permanent fashion and 
membership of which is determined by birth’37. The ICTR also excluded groups that are 
more mobile and are joined by a voluntary commitment, among them economic or 
political groups. Afterwards, the ICTR defined each category of the protected groups. 
The Tribunal referred to the Nottebohm case rendered by the International Court of 
Justice38 (hereinafter: the ICJ), ascertaining that membership in national groups arises 
from a shared legal bond based on common citizenship. Nationality, under the ICJ’s 
judgment, is defined as ‘a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, 
a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence 
of reciprocal rights and duties’39. A national group is, therefore, determined strictly by 
citizenship, although Lemkin’s idea on nationality was far wider and appealed to genuine 
traditions, culture and psychology40. An ethnic group was characterised by sharing 
a common language or culture41, while racial grouping was marked out by hereditary 
physical traits, often linked to geographical regions42, rather than other factors such as 
national, cultural, religious or linguistic ones. Finally, a religious group was described 
as sharing a religion, denomination or form of worship43.
It is clear that these definitions are insufficient in the process of legal interpretation, 
since all of them entail further discrepancies. The ICTR brought a solution to the problem 
– providing a conviction for genocide despite the fact that the group involved could not 
be objectively included in one of the protected groups listed in the 1948 Convention. 
The tribunal referred to travaux préparatoires of the 1948 Convention, concluding that 
the crime of genocide is above all determined by its special intent, based on the partial 
or complete destruction of the group. This intent has become a constituent element 
of the crime, and without this element it would be impossible to consider such an act 
as genocide. For an assumption that an act constitutes a crime of genocide, it has to 
be committed against individuals because of their membership to a group. A victim, 
therefore, is chosen irrespective of its personal characteristic, but because of its 
membership to national, ethnic, racial or religious grouping. The Tribunal authorised 
individual criminal responsibility for genocide, even when an act was directed against 
a group other than one of those listed in Article 2 of the 1948 Convention. In the Akayesu 
case, the subjective element seemed to prevail, since the intention of the drafters of the 
1948 Convention was to protect groups characterised by their stability and permanence. 
The actual status of such a group becomes irrelevant, as long as the perpetrator tempore 
 36 C. Lingaas, Defining the Protected Groups…
 37 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu…, p. 511.
 38 ICJ, Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment of 6 April 1955, I.C.J. Reports 1955.
 39 Ibidem, p. 23.
 40 C. LINGAAS, Defining the Protected Groups…, p. 6.
 41 ICTR, Akayesu case, p. 513.
 42 Ibidem, p. 514.
 43 Ibidem, p. 515.
44
criminis accounts such a group to one of those listed in Article 2 of the 1948 Convention44. 
This happened in Rwanda, where it was impossible to account the Tutsi tribe to any of 
the national, ethnic, racial or religious groups. Moreover, the Tutsi’s mother tongue was 
exactly the same as Hutu. The ICTR concluded that, according to the drafters of the 
1948 Convention, the intention was to protect any stable and permanent group. Since 
the Tutsi constituted a stable and permanent group, and were identified as such by all, 
they deserved the protection under 1948 Convention45.
Turning to the issue of genocidal intent, it does not apply to actual result of the act, 
but to the intent of the perpetrator as such46. Mens rea, therefore, is directed to the 
destruction of a protected group. Subjects of the attack have to play a significant role 
in the aggrieved group, since the victim of genocide is the group itself, not individuals 
alone47. Jurisprudence in this issue, nonetheless, is diverse, since some tribunals require 
quantitative factors48 while others take into account all the factual circumstances of 
the case, among them the nature of the conflict or the structure of the society on the 
territory where the crime was committed49. Furthermore, the responsibility for genocide 
emerges only when the genocidal intent is directed against the members of a group, 
whose elimination would lead to the partial or complete destruction of the group. 
It should be stressed that the subjective element cannot be interpreted in abstracto and the 
elimination of a leader of the group would not cause the responsibility of the perpetrator 
for genocide. Such a possibility would occur only when the elimination of an individual 
prompted the destruction of the group50. Moreover, in the case of different groups being 
the aim of the attack, genocidal intent has to be applied to each group separately51.
The responsibility of individuals under the 1948 Convention is also irrespective of the 
context of a crime, specifically the existence of a policy or plan setting out the intention 
of the partial or full destruction of the group, as happens in the case of crimes against 
humanity. Mens rea does not involve any policy, so the crime might be committed 
individually. What is more, a personal motive, such as economic or political benefits, 
does not exclude the main (genocidal) intent of the perpetrator52. However, this has not 
been entirely adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
In its appeals judgment of 5 July 2001, in the Jelisić case, it expressed that a policy or 
a plan does not constitute a compulsory element of genocide, although the existence 
of such instruments might prove helpful when determining the subjective element of 
a crime and the genocidal intent53. 
 44 W.A. Schabas, Genocide…, p. 24.
 45 ICTR, Akayesu case, p. 701.
 46 P. WEBB, International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation. Genocide, Oxford 2013, pp. 46–50.
 47 International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
“Yearbook of the International Law Commission” 1996, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 45.
 48 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Semanza, Judgment and Sentence of 15 May 2003, ICTR-97-20-T, p. 427.
 49 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, Appeals Judgment of 19 April 2004, ICTY-98-33, pp. 24–38; see also: ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Trial Chamber Judgment, 31 July 2003, IT-97-24-T, p. 523.
 50 P. WEBB, International Judicial Integration…
 51 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadzic, public redacted version of Judgment issued on 24 March 2016, Vol. I of 
IV, IT-95-5/18, p. 541.
 52 K. Ambos, What Does ‘Intent to Destroy’ in Genocide Mean?’, “International Review of the Red Cross” 
2009, Selected Article on International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 91, No. 876, p. 837.
 53 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 5 July 2001, IT-95-10-A, p. 48.
45
Referring to the jurisdiction on genocide on an international level, it is necessary to 
stress that, while adopting the 1948 Convention, the crime of genocide has been regulated 
by one legal regime, namely the jurisdiction of the ICJ54. Pursuant to Article 9 of the 1948 
Convention, disputes relating to the interpretation, application or performance of the 
Convention between the Contracting Parties should be submitted to the ICJ. The ICJ has 
only ever heard one case concerning the responsibility of a State for the crime of genocide 
– the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide case)55, which dealt with the ethnic cleansing on the 
territory of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The UN General Assembly Resolution 
47/121 of 18 December 1992 stipulated that a policy of ethnic cleansing, consisting of 
the creation of concentration camps in Serbia and Montenegro, was an act of genocide56. 
The International Court of Justice ascertained that ‘ethnic cleansing’ was, in practice, 
used for the process of cleansing the territory of groups with the use of force or methods 
of intimidation. It should be considered that ethnic cleansing was not included in the 
1948 Convention. Moreover, such a proposition was rejected when drafting the 1948 
Convention. Nevertheless, the ICJ declared that ethnic cleansing might be considered 
as genocide, though genocidal elements in the meaning of 1948 Convention had to be 
fulfilled. The mens rea of genocide is characterised by special intent – the total or partial 
elimination of a group. Ethnic cleansing in the form of deportations or the displacement 
of members of the group, even with the use of force, does not have to be perpetrated 
with this intent. Such acts could be recognised as genocide if they were undertaken 
through acts listed in the 1948 Convention, with the intent to fully or partially destroy 
a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Nowadays, nonetheless, such an ethnic 
cleansing would be numbered among the crimes against humanity57. 
Although, before the Second World War, the unlawful conduct of an individual was 
attributed to a state, and hence individual responsibility was removed, the Nuremberg 
developments introduced individual criminal responsibility, and from then on there 
are two legal regimes on responsibility for international crimes58. As to genocide, since 
the adoption of the statutes of international criminal tribunals, the jurisdiction over 
genocide has been based on the following regimes: the jurisdiction of the ICJ on one 
hand, and the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals on the other59. This may 
imply some repercussions, since there are potentially two international bodies that are 
capable of upholding the case regarding responsibility for the crime of genocide. However, 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ is based on the responsibility of States, whereas the capacity of 
international criminal tribunals exclusively concerns individuals. The 1948 Convention 
provides the State’s obligation to prevent and punish genocide, while individuals may 
 54 A. Cassesse, Cassesse’s International Criminal Law, Oxford 2010, p. 112.
 55 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43.
 56 UN General Assembly, Resolution No. 47/121, 18 December 1992, UN Doc. A/RES/47/121.
 57 W.A. Schabas, Genocide…, p. 21.
 58 A.B. Loewensten, S.A. Kostas, Divergent Approaches to Determining Responsibility for Genocide: 
The Darfur Commission of Inquiry and the ICJ’s Judgment in the Genocide Case, “Journal of International 
Criminal Justice” 2007, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 839–857. 
 59 A. Cassesse, Cassese’s International Criminal…, p. 112.
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be held responsible in a criminal nature60. Nevertheless, there has still been a risk that 
these two bodies will interpret certain elements of genocide differently. 
Article 25(4) of the Rome Statute stipulates that ‘no provision in this Statute relating to 
individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international 
law’. The reverse provision has been introduced to Article 59 of the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 200161. However, it must 
be remembered that State responsibility has never been criminal in nature, contrary to 
individual responsibility62.
By way of example, when it comes to the application of the 1948 Convention and the 
concurrence of individual and state responsibility, the UN International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur, a situation that was later referred to the ICC63, ascertained that there 
can be two levels of mens rea distinguished in the context of genocide64. The perpetrator 
must intend to commit one of the acts listed in Article 2 of the 1948 Convention, 
specifically: killing or causing bodily or mental harm. The second level is called dolus 
specialis, which requires an intent to destroy the group as such. Such a approach, often 
called ‘purpose-based’65, was also considered by the International Court of Justice in 
the Genocide case66. At least on the point of individual criminal responsibility there are 
therefore no difficulties that intent poses in these two legal regimes. A discrepancy may 
appear when proving the intent of a State and of an individual. While proof of specific 
intent in individual criminal responsibility provides no further discrepancies, the intent 
of a State becomes difficult to establish, since intention in principio is individual in 
nature67. which therefore makes it difficult to characterise an act of a State as genocide, 
so it becomes unavoidable to invoke general rules applying in the context of a State’s 
responsibility. 
According to Article 2 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, an internationally wrongful act of a State appears when conduct 
is attributable to the State under international law and constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the State. It is a well-established rule of international 
customary law that a State can act only by and through its agents68. The State, therefore, 
can commit genocide through the acts of its officials, and if an organ of a State commits 
 60 P. Gaeta, On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?, “European Journal of 
International Law” 2007, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 631–648.
 61 UN General Assembly, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, 54 
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 43, UN Doc. A/56/83(2001). 
 62 A.B. Loewensten, S.A. Kostas, Divergent Approaches to Determining…, p. 844.
 63 UN Security Council, Resolution 1593 (2005), 31 March 2005, UN Doc. S/RES/1593/2005. 
 64 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1563 of 18 September 
2004, UN Doc. S/2005/60, 25 January 2005.
 65 A. Cassesse, Cassese’s International Criminal…, pp. 118–119.
 66 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention…, p. 187.
 67 W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, Cambridge 2000, p. 444. 
 68 Permanent Court of International Justice, Certain Questions Relating to Settlers of German Origin 
in the Territory ceded by Germany to Poland, Advisory Opinion, 10 September 1923, Publications of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, No. 6, p. 22; see also: ICJ, Case Concerning Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, 
merits, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 65.
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any of the acts listed in the 1948 Convention, the responsibility of the State arises69. 
Hence, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur’s report can meet with some 
objections, since the Commission has examined the intention of the central government 
and provided the analysis of the leadership’s intent only. This, however, raises doubts 
on which high-ranking person is the leader. The statement of the Commission may be 
surprising also because of the fact that it did not ascertain genocide committed by the 
central government because of the lack of a state policy pursued by the government70. 
Neither the ICJ nor the ad hoc tribunals require such a policy as a compulsory element 
of genocide71.
CONCLUSIONS
The crime of genocide is undoubtedly one of the worst atrocities that international law 
may face. For several decades, its criminalisation has been a dead letter, nevertheless, in 
1990s that hibernation ceased, forcing the international community to face the atrocious 
incidents that took place in Rwanda or Srebrenica. Generally, the construction of the 
crime of genocide in the 1948 Convention may be recognised as acceptable. Nonetheless, 
there are shortcomings that need to be addressed. Most discrepancies may be removed 
by jurisprudence, though this would raise a plea of the infringement of certainty, which 
should be preserved in criminal law particularly. Although there is no hierarchy of 
international crimes, it is not for nothing that genocide is called ‘the crime of crimes’. 
This is the reason why international criminal law should pay more attention to the 
developments of the modern world, since atrocities might affect groups other than those 
expressed in the 1948 Convention. Technological and sociological progress definitely 
imply the need to reconsider the scope of protected groups under the Convention and 
it may become essential to widen the scope of protection from atrocities to other groups 
that would not legally aspire to the crime of genocide. 
Secondly, it may be unavoidable to introduce an enforcement mechanism into the 1948 
Convention, for example the creation of a special body responsible for the prevention 
of the crime of genocide. Calling into existence a Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide within the UN system is, undoubtedly, one step ahead in that process, though, 
as expressed by the Office of the Special Adviser, this institution alone is not able to do 
anything. States should undertake more determined steps not only to punish genocide, 
but above all to prevent and protect human beings from the crime of genocide. This 
would not, unfortunately, happen without political will from international actors. In this 
aspect, the responsibility to protect doctrine may complement the obligation to prevent 
under the 1948 Convention by strengthening political will and morality to effectively 
protect human beings from international crimes. 
 69 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention…, p. 179.
 70 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission…, p. 4. 
 71 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention…, para. 373; see also: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisić…; 
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